

Towards a Global Citizens' Assembly

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The submission proposes to replace public opinion, partisanism and special interests with public judgment on a global scale. Key to this is to introduce a randomly sampled jury-style process where people are randomly selected for national and regional assemblies. The benefit is that the cross-section of society can be informed to make wiser decisions than uninformed society at large. In order to promote the process, four bodies are instituted with members drawn by lot. The Agenda Council has the sole power to prioritize topics. Interest Panels are assembled to present opinions and solutions, thus without being able to exert influence over the preferred outcome. These solutions are proposed to the local assemblies where the selected members receive balanced information and shortlist the best solutions. These shortlists would subsequently build up to an annual Global Citizens' Assembly, drafted by lot from the national and regional participants, and whose final recommendations would enjoy the same status as UN resolutions. When the process is completed, an Oversight Council is drawn by lot from the Global Citizens' Assembly in order to improve the next round of the process.





1. Abstract

Global cooperation and coordination on crucial global problems has been stymied by parochial interests – either of national governments and their politicians, business enterprises with short-term imperatives, or civil society organizations with narrow advocacy agendas. No decision making process currently exists that carries sufficient moral legitimacy to compel global action. This proposal can solve that crucial problem and generate that global, moral authority. This can be accomplished by facilitating decision-making by the people of earth themselves, rather than as bickering national, religious, corporate, ethnic, or other factions. The key question is this: *‘What would the people of the world choose to do in addressing critical global problems if they could somehow all focus on one problem, learn about it, hear a wide range of possible solutions, deliberate, and then decide what to do?’*

There is a way to accomplish exactly this fundamental goal through **a randomly sampled jury-style process** that first brings together ordinary people in all corners of the planet to learn and deliberate, without the typical constraints of partisan competition or special interest domination. These national and regional assemblies would subsequently build up to an annual Global Citizens’ Assembly, drafted by lot from the national and regional participants, and whose final recommendations would enjoy the same status as UN resolutions.

By insisting on the use of random selection for creating citizens’ assemblies, this model returns to the central principle of Athenian government: random selection (also known as sortition). In ancient Athens, the large majority of public functions were assigned by random selection. Renaissance states such as Venice and Florence worked on the same basis and experienced centuries of political stability. Though the procedure was largely forgotten in the 19th and 20th century (except for jury trials), it is currently experiencing a remarkable revival beyond the judiciary. Decision-making with random selection has been successfully applied in many countries of the world, including Australia, Bolivia, China, France, Germany, Ireland, Mongolia, and the USA.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently called for *‘bold and innovative reforms to bring in the young, the poor and minorities into the political system’*. *Random selection was the way forward, he said: ‘An interesting idea (...) would be to reintroduce the ancient Greek practice of selecting parliaments by lot instead of election. In other words, parliamentarians would no longer be nominated by political parties, but chosen at random for a limited term, in the way many jury systems work. This would prevent the formation of self-serving and self-perpetuating political classes disconnected from their electorates.’ [1]*

With random selection, you do not ask everyone to vote on an issue few people really understand (as in a referendum), but you draft a random sample of the population and make sure they come to grips with the subject matter in order to take a sensible decision. **A cross-section of society that is informed can make wiser decisions than an entire society that is uninformed.**

Around that core idea, our proposal is a process giving a hearing to today’s organized interests like activists and industry, political parties and civil society, but prioritising a role for everyday randomly-selected people at the centre. [2]



This happens through four bodies. An **Agenda Council** has sole power to prioritize topics without saying how to solve them. **Interest Panels** are then assembled to present diverse opinions and submit potential solutions, and thus give substantial input without being able to exert influence over the preferred outcome. The proposed solutions put forward by the Interest Panels are then considered at **National/Regional Assemblies** made up of randomly chosen people from all walks of life who receive balanced information, pose questions to experts of their choosing, and shortlist what they see as the strongest potential solutions. Finally, a **Global Citizens' Assembly** is brought together by random selection from the regional participants, to deliberate on the shortlisted proposals and develop the final recommendations.

At the end of the process, an **Oversight Council** is drawn by lot from the Global Citizens' Assembly to help improve the rules and procedures for the next cycle of this deliberative process.

In short, we propose replacing *public opinion* with something more substantive: *public judgment*.

Although this proposal deals with redesigning global governance, it is not a plea to replace (or mandate wholesale reform of) the United Nations (UN). Rather, it is a pragmatic and incremental attempt to devise an addition to the global governance framework which is expected to have a transformational impact. It is designed to handle the major risks, threats and challenges of today in a way that is realistic, effective, flexible, self-learning, and (crucially) implementable. It might be applied to more UN processes and it might lead to grander changes at the UN level, but this is not its primary mission. We are not redesigning an organization: we are bolting something on.

The principles we design for here are genuinely informed citizen engagement, truer representation through random selection, pragmatism, the value of face-to-face encounters, and the need to connect the global with the local.

We propose this model as an international network of governance innovators with a wealth of both theoretical and hands-on experience. We know how to deliver this.

2. Description of the model

1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

1.1 The problem – and why the usual solutions won't solve it

Today, the world seems to be divided between increasingly weakened democracies, increasingly emboldened autocracies and a set of countries hesitating between both. Whereas the democratic option seemed the obvious way forward in the 1990s, today many post-communist and post-colonial countries have started to doubt whether democracy can actually deliver. Is it capable of handling global challenges such as climate change, migration, and debt? Is it still the best bet for world peace? Is it even capable of guaranteeing domestic peace?

In March 2017, China Daily wrote: 'Unlike Western democracies, which seem increasingly obsessed with showmanship and short-term elections, China's



leadership has a long-term target and is more inclined to plan for the next generation and beyond.' [3]

This may be true, but this advantage comes at a price. While autocratic regimes can sometimes be more apt at facing long-term challenges, they can only do so by silencing voices of dissent. Western-style democracies, on the other hand, generally perform better when it comes to diversity of opinion and innovation, but their long-term policies have been crippled by short-term electoral imperatives. This has led to a prioritising of style over substance. As a consequence, trust in those in political office is now so low that taking hard decisions has become politically impossible. Mistrust, once the defining characteristic of life under autocratic rule, has now become the dominant feature of western democracies as well.

So, autocracies = bad for dialogue; democracies = bad for the long term.

Whatever their respective merits, on the international level both forms of government suffer from national myopia. Countries think like countries. Regardless of whether they are democratic or autocratic, domestic political interests are always prioritized over global interests. The post-war model of multilateral talks has been severely conditioned by domestic politics, preventing effective policies for the global challenges we are faced with today. As the world is globalizing, so are the major risks and threats of today. Yet it is hard to find major solutions for the world when negotiators always feel compelled to have global needs take a back seat to national concerns (and thus shrill domestic public opinion). This is the central problem we aim to fix.

1.2 A scenario and a solution

Imagine the Paris Climate Accord had been negotiated not by countries but by well-informed everyday citizens. Would it have taken over two decades before an agreement was finally reached? And would the result have been without any mechanism to compel global action, without any leverage driving countries toward a specific target by a specific date, to adequately sanction a country, or even to prevent one from withdrawing from the Agreement? Would it have been driven by political optics, concerns over media reporting and cute fudges to protect the positions of influential donors spanning industry, unions and advocates?

The answer is no.

With ordinary citizens, a common ground position – providing a trusted basis for action – would have been found that was faster, stronger and cheaper. We have evidence for this. In 2015, 10,000 citizens engaged in 97 debates across 76 countries in a global deliberation on climate change, all following an identical protocol aiming at gathering their enlightened opinion to support global decision-making. To date, the event, which was called World Wide Views on Climate and Energy, stands out as the largest deliberation with ordinary citizens ever held on global scale.

Participants had not been elected or appointed, but were randomly selected, so as to ensure maximal representativeness and diversity. In Germany, they had been drafted by lot from the official register. In Japan, they had been sampled by a polling bureau. In Mauritania, Madagascar and the Republic of Fiji, they had been recruited on the street, allowing illiterate people to have their say, too.



Their conclusions went much further than what was eventually reached in the Paris Accord: agreeing to make commitments ‘legally binding for all countries’ and ‘include a long-term goal for zero emissions at the end of this century’. [4] Freed from national interests and commercial stakes, citizens worldwide were able to agree on far-reaching, long-term goals for the planet and reach a degree of consensus that was unattainable for politicians and diplomats.

Alas, by refusing to solve the global issues of the 21st century by anything but the rusty methods of the 19th and 20th century, the world might have missed its appointment with the future – as for all sides the costs of inaction are becoming acute.

Imagine a windy September morning in New York, where for the very first time in history the Global Citizens’ Assembly takes place. Up to 800 citizens from around the world take an oath committing themselves to treat each other with respect, listen with an open mind and make decisions they genuinely believe to be in the best interests of the world. These delegates are neither politicians nor diplomats. They are lay citizens who come from all corners of the world. There are farmers and traders from Africa, teachers and programmers from Asia, parents and students from Central Europe, miners, child care workers, dentists, air traffic controllers, the disabled – people from all walks of life; a cross section of the people who you pass in the street today.

Over the past months, each and every one of them has been taking part in large-scale, public deliberations in their respective home countries or regions. At these preliminary sessions, they will have weighed a wide array of information and viewpoints by working with other citizens – like them, all randomly-selected – in order to acquire a sound understanding of the issue at hand. Face-to-face discussion with equal share of voice will have allowed to them to identify common ground rather than magnifying differences.

The ensuing Global Citizens’ Assembly we have in mind is not a meeting of countries, but of citizens. The room will be descriptively representative – it will look like the population of our planet. The selection model guarantees at least one participant from every one of the 195 UN member states. They will work for three weeks on the topics they brought from the national and regional level and draft a common final decision, supported by evidence.

This process makes for a global governance model that is representative, deliberative, and solution-focused. It favours long-term thinking that is not “captured” by polarized special interests.

1.3 Core principle – random selection and deliberation

The most innovative and radical underlying principle of the model is the random selection of the participants who will deliberate about policy proposals. Random selection has been used in many political systems throughout history, the most prominent being ancient Athenian Democracy and Italian City State Republics during the Renaissance. Random selection as a procedure for selecting representatives was long seen as a feature of democracy. As Montesquieu, quoting Aristotle, wrote in *The Spirit of Laws*: ‘Voting by lot is in the nature of democracy; voting by choice is in the nature of aristocracy’. With the rise of representative government following the liberal democracies of the 18th Century,



random selection fell into almost two centuries of oblivion before making a remarkable come-back in contemporary political practice since the 1970's and the development of new methods of citizen participation combining random selection with deliberation. [5]

Many countries use random selection today in the form of juries and/or opinion polls. Juries are generally informed and deliberative, but with polls, we ask people what they think when they don't think. Our model asks people what they think after they have had a chance to think. This is because we combine random selection with deliberation — a kind of conversation that is open-minded, and oriented to solving problems and finding common ground instead of winning arguments and scoring political points. The random samples of citizens are gathered for face-to-face meetings, are given time, information and opportunities to exchange. It primarily takes place at round tables of six to ten participants each, rather than large plenary settings. It requires a different architecture than ornate, horseshoe-shaped chambers that copy ancient theatres. It has no need for dramatic spokespersons, but requires good facilitators. Deliberation, unlike polling, is based on collective and not on individual preferences.

Why random selection? Because it makes for more inclusive and impartial representation, because everyone gets the same chance to participate, and because it is cheaper than existing models. Why deliberation? Because it taps into the wisdom of the crowd and makes for genuine exchange of arguments after information, because it guarantees robust, resilient, long-term decisions that are trusted.

1.4 Evidence from practice

These ideas are not just theoretical. They have been tested and implemented hundreds of times throughout the world by both researchers and engagement practitioners. All provide tangible evidence of the ease with which everyday citizens can deliberate on complex matters, leading to sensible, workable decisions that the wider population can trust. We offer here four examples to illustrate the principles of the model – and more importantly, the practical connection to a final decision.

Geelong Citizens Jury

The Victorian State Government in Australia acted on the recommendation of an independent Commission of Inquiry and dismissed the Greater Geelong City Council, and committed to consult the community about its local governance model before the next council election. This inadvertently created one of the single greatest opportunities to explore how citizens would design a local system of representation if given the chance.

Over four months a randomly selected group drawn from the local area convened periodically to deliberate on the remit – 'How do we want to be democratically represented by a future council?' Drawing from international and domestic advice and their own choices of expert speakers, the Jury delivered a final report with 13 recommendations, 2 'practical' (compliant with current laws) and 11 'aspirational' (requiring legislative or regulatory changes). The Victorian Government agreed to adopt 12 of the 13 recommendations.



The Victorian Legislative Council passed the City of Greater Geelong Amendment Bill 2017 on June 8, bringing about the new Mayoral and Councillor structure as recommended by the Citizens' Jury. [6]

Irish Constitutional Convention

In 2011, a group of Irish academics wanted to replicate British Columbia's Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform (2004) as a way of bringing everyday citizens into political decision making. The project was called We the Citizens. It attracted private funding and was designed to prove that public deliberation on a difficult topic among randomly-selected citizens could work.

We the Citizens the next iteration: the Irish Constitutional Convention (ICC)—held 2012-2014. The ICC operated over a 14-month period, meeting over the course of 10 weekends, following deliberative practice. Its 100 members included 66 citizens randomly-selected by a research agency, 33 politicians from the Oireachtas (parliament) and the Northern Ireland Assembly and an independent chair appointed by the government.

What came out of the ICC was a series of questions, referenda, and parliamentary votes, including Ireland's historic support for marriage equality in 2015. The elected representatives who had participated in the ICC then became advocates for the next iteration: the Irish Citizens' Assembly (2016-2017).

The Citizens' Assembly tackled a number of questions, the first being the highly contentious issue of abortion, followed by responding to the challenges and opportunities of an ageing population; fixed term parliaments; the manner in which referenda are held; and how the State can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change. [7]

National Health Reform in China

The potential for citizen deliberation is not a privilege of established democracies. Over the past two decades, China has shown a remarkable interest in it. Ever since the 1990s, the Chinese government has encouraged countless small-scale public consultations in villages, towns and counties to deal with matters such as the price of water or electricity.

This tradition was stepped up by the organization of deliberative polls in different cities, like Wenling City in 2005, 2006 and 2008. These polls followed an international standard for transparent, open-ended public deliberation and typically consisted of random samples of up to 300 participants convening on a single day to discuss topics such as public works and how to prioritize them. [8]

Based on these local experiences, the Chinese government is experimenting with citizens' engagement on a national level. In 2005, Beijing organized public hearings on the touchy issue of the personal income-tax threshold that were broadcast and streamed live. [9]

In 2008-2009, the most expressive example to date took place with the National Health Reform, a major reform for affordable care comparable with Obamacare in the US. After the SARS epidemic of 2003, public calls for improved healthcare laid at the basis of a five-year long process of consultation with administrators, academics, and international experts. Highly unusual by Chinese standards, the



bill was subjected to public scrutiny after a draft version was published online. Almost 36,000 comments were received, 20% of which came from farmers, factory workers and migrants. As a result, the bill was amended in 137 places. Though the process was online only, it confirmed the nascent interest for deliberation in the world's most populous nation. [10]

World Wide Views on Climate and Energy 2015

This project was the third iteration of the World Wide Views (WWViews) method that aims at involving ordinary citizens into international decision making processes. It gathered 10,000 ordinary citizens from 76 countries of the world in a daylong deliberation about the hot topics of the Paris Climate Summit (21st Conference of Parties 21 or COP21). Both in terms of scale and impact, World Wide Views on Climate was the first truly global citizen deliberation in history. It was closely connected to decision making through a collaboration both with UNFCCC and the French Government, and it was backed by more than a hundred organizations worldwide that were able to deploy national dissemination strategies of the results. Because of their quality and long-term relevance, the results were presented and discussed during all rounds of climate negotiations in 2015 and beyond at the 22nd and soon 23rd Climate Summit. World Wide Views proved that it is possible to engage ordinary citizens in solving global challenges at a very low cost. [11]

1.5 An incremental approach, with continuous learning

The proposal here is not intended to be the one perfect model of global governance. Instead, we are proposing something that (1) is clearly implementable under current conditions without having to replace the existing channels of governance; (2) if implemented, would be substantially better than what exists today; and (3) most importantly, contains the capability for rapid and continuous learning and adaptation. This capacity comes from the procedural nature of the model and its strong inclusive character. Participants at all stages are being asked how to improve the process for the next iteration. Also, as the topics addressed by the Assembly regularly change, each iteration brings new partners, stakeholders, local organizers, experts, who all learn through the process.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL

Overview

Public decision-making requires hearing from a range of advocate voices: lobbyists, NGOs, industry, nations and ad hoc groupings. Our job is to make sure that the task of agreeing on recommendations is handled by a group who is both representative and free from impairments on their thinking so that they can earn public trust, and that those advocate voices get an equal chance to make their case. This is approached in four parts: an Agenda Council, Interest Panels, National and Regional Assemblies, and a Global Citizens' Assembly.

An Agenda Council prioritizes topics which require resolution, without saying how to resolve them. Its circa 200 members are drawn by lot from among the outgoing participants at the Regional Assemblies.

Numerous (unlimited) Interest Panels (self-nominated; wide range of interests; groupings of ~12 people) propose researched solutions which address the problems framed by the Agenda Council – very substantive input, but with vastly reduced lobbying power.



The proposed solutions put forward by the Interest Panels are first considered at National and Regional Assemblies made up of randomly chosen people from all walks of life who pose questions to be addressed by experts of their choosing and shortlist what they see as the strongest potential solutions.

The Global Citizens' Assembly is the centrepiece: a randomly-selected group of c. 800 people spanning every country and culture in the world. The members of this assembly will have spent several months reading and conversing in their home countries before assembling for around two weeks each year to see what common ground can be found among people we all identify with, and develop a final resolution.

This model does not involve simplistic voting exercises: the operations are designed to identify statements of common ground that the vast majority of participants can stand behind. This is made possible with considerable time, and the removal of the incentive to disagree: the need to face election.

2.1 Setting the agenda: the Agenda Council

The Agenda Council consists of around 200 members drafted by lot from the outgoing members of the Regional Assemblies who volunteer. It has a limited but crucial task of setting the agenda, i.e. prioritize topics which require resolution without proposing policies itself for solving them. An important feature of a stand-alone Agenda Council is the ability to perform a thorough risk assessment to prioritize global challenges, rather than simply selecting problems that happen to be currently in the media. Once the Agenda Council has selected a problem or problems for the following iteration and issued its call, the Agenda Council will disband until a new Agenda Council is drawn for the next cycle.

2.2 Developing proposals and potential solutions: Interest Panels

Once the Agenda Council has selected a topic with a series of remit questions to address, they will issue a call for proposals. Any organizations – from Global NGO or company down to ad hoc group of individuals of at least a dozen people (an Interest Panel) – may submit a proposal for how to address the selected problem. This format aims to give equal share of voice to all potential good ideas for solving a problem.

2.3 Reviewing proposals and learning: National & Regional Assemblies

Nationally/regionally-based global mini-assemblies will be organized with access for people in every country. The number of participants for each Regional Assembly will be allowed to vary by what is appropriate within a country (1.2bn people in China and 3m in New Zealand means that flexibility and scalability are essential).

Recruitment of participants

Participants will be drawn randomly according to the best practices appropriate for each area (some have comprehensive resident lists, and some do not: raw addresses and random phone numbers can equally be used). We use stratification to assure a close demographic match with the population by variables relevant to the topic, such as age, gender, language, geography and indicators of wealth and educational level. The goal is simply to get the most representative sample possible.



All participants at all levels will have their travel, meals and lodgings covered. In order to ensure that those with limited means can adequately participate, members will also receive a small payment to help cover lost income or childcare.

Duration

Ideally, the National/Regional Assemblies will gather on the same day all over the globe. The duration of these assemblies will vary by issue, and also depending on the culture of different countries. For example, participants might attend about five all-day meetings, with each meeting spaced about three weeks apart (equating to a ~3 month involvement in their home country). or may convene for a single week.

Method and Information input

Participants receive a diversity of information from sources on the topic coming from the Interest Panels. Documents can be translated into all languages necessary for wider sharing across any of the national/regional assemblies, and effective provisions can be made to facilitate participation of illiterate participants.

Each regional assembly will likely call additional witnesses that they deem appropriate and necessary to become well informed: taking the baseline of proposed solutions and challenging them with questions and clarifications. These regional assemblies will perform some of their work in smaller break-out groups, with a focus on ensuring that they understand the information presented, and developing questions for expert witnesses, whose answers and related information can be taken by these jurors to the Global Citizens' Assembly. It should be noted that all these groups are assisted by impartial facilitators.

2.4 Deliberating and deciding: the Global Citizens' Assembly

From among members of each regional assembly a further random draw (stratified for the same demographic measures) will be conducted to bring together a globally representative sample of around 800 people.

The Global Citizens' Assembly will gather in-person for about two weeks. Assisted by a spectrum of expert witnesses, they will benefit from vastly different life experiences and perspectives. Unlike almost all global gatherings, a random sample is not simply a gathering of the wealthy "haves" or influential NGOs, but neither does it exclude those voices: it seeks to bring together a descriptive mix to find out what common ground is achievable.

As people care deeply about the possibility to make themselves understood, an adequate number of working languages should be determined. Deliberation has been successfully done in multiple-languages settings like Belgium, a country with three official languages. Working with the UN would allow for a reasonable level of translation assistance.

The experience in sharing views and perspectives – supported by facts and sources identified at their regional assemblies – will lead to agreement in some areas (i.e that facts are valid), and a list of contentious facts/assertions that are in dispute. The group can work to identify a trusted source, but ultimately work to identify common ground positions which they can live with.



Recommendations from the Global Citizens' Assembly gain the same status as the UN Resolutions emanating from the General Assembly or the Security Council. Like UN resolutions, they would contain two sections: a preamble (showing underlying intent) and an operative part (an outline of the specific agreed course of action).

2.5 Improving the process: the Oversight Council

At the end of every Global Citizens' Assembly, an Oversight Council is chosen by lot from among outgoing participants. The role of this body is to help to improve the process for the next iteration, by conducting a review of the process with the Coordination Secretariat. We believe it is important to learn from previous experiences, and no one is better placed to comment about the process than those who have been through it. To limit its power, the Oversight Council is only concerned with rules and procedures, not with the topics at hand.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRST ITERATION

3.1 Process design and oversight

In case this proposal wins the Global Challenges Prize, the authors will establish an international Coordination Secretariat — a diverse and impartial group of deliberation experts who have the capacity to produce the design for the first iteration.

It should be noted that the Coordination Secretariat is explicitly without partisan alignment, and does not offer public comment on any issue. To further enhance legitimacy and reduce the potential for bias, the process will include an auditing role for an external Integrity Group drawn from among the active interests involved in the project (public authorities, governments, NGOs, private sector). They will receive the full design, with the capacity to make the case for amendments if they identify a bias.

3.2 Agenda setting

For the first iteration, the topic for discussion will be chosen by the Coordination Secretariat — ideally, working with a major UN body — to simply select one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) established by the UN in 2015.

A “blocked” issue that countries find hard to agree upon, could be an excellent candidate for adding a large scale voice of informed citizens to the public discourse.

3.3 The rest of the process

In this first iteration, the Interest Panels, National/Regional Assemblies and Global Citizens' Assembly would be no different from the model described above. It is unlikely that the final recommendations of the first iteration will receive a status comparable with UN Resolutions. However, as formal statements of an informed global citizenry, they will carry an unmistakable moral authority.

At the end of the first National/Regional Assemblies, a sample of outgoing participants will be chosen by lot to serve in the very first Agenda Council. At the end of the first Global Citizens' Assembly, a sample of its participants will be chosen by lot to serve in the very first Oversight Council.



4. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.1 Funding

The process is comparatively simple to fund and administer as it does not require a special international scheme to be created before launching the process. The cost at national level is easily accommodated within national Foreign Affairs communications budgets and may be complemented by aid agency funding to support poorer countries (if needed). For the global component, the cost of bringing participants to a single location is also a national cost that can be budgeted easily as they are direct costs.

The work of global coordination for the first iteration and preparation of subsequent iterations can be delivered for €4m which could be a mix of UN cost of operation and co-funding by global philanthropies, with part of the prize money as seed funding.

4.2 Getting the resolutions implemented

There have been many cases of excellent proposals that were ignored by political decision makers. What can be done so that decision makers have powerful incentives to act on the proposals from the Global Citizens' Assembly?

The most powerful trend in global policies is away from insiders, experts, and those seen to be drawing large salaries for making grand pronouncements. A reform injecting everyday people into a 'remote' institution is good domestic politics in any political system. UN member countries make global decisions on a domestic political basis, and this approach factors that in. Having a precise measure and feeling of the "real" opinion of their constituencies will allow policy makers and negotiators to adopt strong strategies based on the level of support of their population back home. They will also get insights in the opinion of citizens of other countries which will allow them to build coalitions based on topics and level of support in the home country.

At an operational level, we apply two tactics: we apply the pivotal learning from the Irish Constitutional Convention by embedding two national legislators from each major party in the national level conferences in an oversight role; and we ensure that the national level deliberations have a formal reporting channel to domestic parliaments and relevant branches of the executive. The key here is that this is an "easy give" for those in office who are often given the thankless political task of applying high-minded treaty commitments into actual regulation where domestic political losers are vocal and active. Our design produces people who stand behind the decision and help leaders lead. It has been successfully demonstrated and proven as appealing in projects around the world.

4.3 Getting the model implemented

To be successful, any new model must be adopted by the current political decision makers – a giant first step. How could this be accomplished?

We could possibly use a portion of the prize funds to create a political moment. Imagine every national newspaper around the world on the same day inviting the President or Prime Minister to support a global trial of this approach, backed by a short explanatory video on YouTube. We are creating something that political leaders will want to be aligned with. Faced with a large global media event domestic journalists will ask leaders for their immediate response.



To increase the likelihood of success, we would aim to individually brief 6-8 influential world leaders with whom we have existing connections. Our estimation is that if popular politicians on all sides of politics rapidly align themselves with the proposal, it creates a political benefit for other leaders to join the group – remembering that the commitment being made is a politically appealing one as they are saying ‘I want more everyday people involved in important public decisions’.

3. Motivation

3.1 GLOBAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

3.1.1 Mandate

3.1.1.1 Within the UN framework, to improve input legitimacy, we propose a consultative body of elected global citizens to sit alongside the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly: the Global Consultative Council (UNGCC).

3.1.1.2 The UNGCC would be a representative chamber, akin to the German Bundesrat and the UK’s House of Lords. It would act as a ‘Global Senate’ and would assess the general quality of resolutions coming out of the UNSC. However, it would hold no legislative power: rather, its leverage would be derived from the expression of international opinion, in monitoring the UNSC’s effectiveness in the view of the global community, and ensuring that the UNSC operates as the UN Charter intended.

3.1.1.3 The UNGCC would be able to bring issues to the UNSC through the UNSG after consultation. This would bring the UNGCC into the cradle of UN decision-making and grant it more legitimacy within member states.

3.1.1.4 The UNGCC would purport to act on issues from a global perspective to avoid national interests frustrating the political process. Crucially, the UNGCC would be a channel for non-state actors to bring their concerns about global issues to the highest levels of the system, in response to more vocal demands for insight and influence. This would be partly formalised in the UNGCC members’ requirement to be consulted by and receive representations from designated NGOs and civil society organisations on certain matters that pass through the chamber.

3.1.2 Composition

3.1.2.1 Each member state would be allocated two senators, one male and one female, to represent the views on global issues of the people of their state. As such, the senators would be independent from their governments, de facto and de jure. Senators would be elected on fixed terms that exceed their country’s political terms (e.g. five to seven years), and would be limited to two terms of service to avoid institutional inertia (cf. the European Parliament). UNGCC elections would be divided into three separate election cycles to safeguard continuity. The elections must be held independently from national elections to ensure they represent the interests of people rather than governments. Elections would be organised by national governments but supervised by an independent commission in each nation. The overall process would be monitored by a special UNGA Select Committee (see 3.3.3), to promote a globally consistent process.



3.1.2.2 Unlike a global ‘parliament’, the UNGCC would convene only three to four times each year, if necessary in different locations, to stave off member states’ concerns of another costly bureaucratic institution. The UNGCC can drive its own procedures and establish sub-committees to have frequent interaction with the UNSC and other institutions.

3.1.2.3 The authors are cognisant of varying degrees of voter freedom across member states. Elections to different UN bodies would be different depending on national standards of democracy. This cannot be changed overnight but must be accepted for reasons of implementability. To discourage unfair elections, UNGCC senators whose elections are not deemed free and fair could be placed in bureaucratic quarantine by the UNGA’s newly created Enforcement Select Committee (see 3.2.3.1), limiting the committees and working groups in which they may participate.

3.1.3 Legitimacy

The UNGCC would provide the missing element in the UN’s multilateral governance platform by strengthening UN’s: responsiveness to concerns of the people; efficacy, accountability and transparency, and openness to consultation with the people; and the effectiveness of policy decisions for the people. It would also incentivise constituencies in nation-states to lobby their own governments more frequently on global policy issues and insist on greater attention being paid to the multilateral agenda. In short, the UNGCC would enhance the UN’s perceived input, throughput and output legitimacy by improving civic participation, organisational accountability and visibility of progress and achievements.

3.2 UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Today, the UNSC’s role remains one of supervising and maintaining international peace and security in its widest sense. However, it lacks both input and output legitimacy: the disconnect between the Permanent 5 and non-P5 has increased as the society of nations has grown, damaging its input legitimacy; the tendency towards reactionary decision-making impedes the UNSC’s capacity to pursue a more stable peace around the world, damaging its output legitimacy.

3.2.1 Membership Expansion

3.2.1.1 The authors recognise that UNSC membership reform would require a UN Charter amendment, which is where resistance to change has so far been focused. However, reforms to the UN system of the breadth proposed in this whole model will necessarily entail legislative action in the UN. Member States will adjust to this when they assess the benefits of the changes in their entirety.

3.2.1.2 The UNSC would be expanded on a regional basis, see Appendix 1. In addition to the P5, every region apart from Europe/North America/Other Westernised States would have two appointed and one elected representative state. The two would be appointed by the regional heads of state, meeting in regional committee, and the one would be elected in the normal annual competition for the UNSC. Europe/North America/Other Westernised States would only be awarded one elected representative, as the region already has three Permanent members. The UNGCC would have one representative elected within the Council from the lowest earning 25% of states (by GDP Per Capita).



Regions are

- Europe/North America/Other Westernised States
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- MENA (League of Arab States)
- ASEAN-States
- Other Asian
- Latin America-Caribbean

3.2.1.3 These new members would increase UNSC membership from 15 to 22. This would add input, throughput and ultimately output legitimacy, and broaden the range of perspectives at the UNSC. The three-fifths' majority threshold for passing UNSC votes would remain in place (14 out of 22 votes in the new UNSC).

3.2.2 Veto Reform

3.2.2.1 The veto system would be reformed to rein in the disproportionate influence of the P5 in the UNSC, which has throughput and output consequences. A four-fifths majority (18/22) would overturn a single P5 veto (more than one would be unchallengeable), and the resolution would be adopted. This mechanism would ensure that a single Permanent Member could not hold the power to block resolutions that the broad community of states would support. N.B. this would not apply to cases where the national security or sovereign integrity of a Permanent Member was threatened or violated, as assessed by the UNSG and Council of Elders (see 3.8.1).

3.2.2.2 Further, despite expanding the UNSC by seven seats, the current number of Permanent members would remain the same. This would likely meet resistance from established 'permanent member candidates' such as Germany, Japan, Brazil and India. However, keeping the number of Permanent seats as low as possible is crucial to efficiency and expediency. Additional veto powers would risk hampering the UNSC with further resentment amongst the wider UN membership.

3.2.2.3 There is a sound argument for avoiding the cancellation of permanent membership and the veto power. Not only would the P5 strongly resist any such change, but the UNSC and veto structure has served the purpose of keeping the great powers at the table. The P5, and the United States in particular, are essential financial contributors to the UN, and their commitment to UN-based multilateralism is in no small part based on maintaining this privileged position within an otherwise largely egalitarian nation-state ethos.

3.2.3 Enforcement

3.2.3.1 To add output impact to the UNSC and to the UN more generally, the UNSC's ability to impose personal sanctions on political leaders defying international law would be strengthened. The UNGA's Enforcement Select Committee would be consulted by the Security Council proposing such a measure and give a judgment on its justifiability. Personal financial sanctions (like the US Magnitzky Act) would sharpen the tools against the worst human rights abusers and lowest governance standards.

3.2.3.2 The weakness of the US's otherwise powerful personal sanctions regime has been its inability to establish wide international support: recalcitrant leaders can easily escape to or place money in states that have not signed up to sanctions. A UN-based global sanctions regime, giving effective enforcement powers to a



committee of the UNGA and UNSC combined, would better (if not entirely) cover this loophole by introducing an element of global jurisdiction and equipping the UN with implementable penalties.

3.2.4 Legitimacy

3.2.4.1 Expanding the UNSC at all would compromise efficiency, and meet some initial resistance from the P5. Nevertheless, it is essential to regain (and retain) any political legitimacy in an international context of shifting global power dynamics. It would also better connect the UNSC with regional organisations and their mechanisms – an area where the UNSC has so far failed.

3.2.4.2 Bringing more states into the heart of international peace and security deliberations would enhance the UN's perceived input legitimacy amongst states, thus (at least incrementally) increasing the UN's transparency and accessibility.

3.2.4.3 The biggest hurdle to the UNSC's perceived effectiveness has been a lack of output legitimacy. Resolutions have been too unambitious in addressing the root causes of conflict; and the P5 have been able to veto resolutions that would have been in the interests of the wider international community: By diluting, yet maintaining, the veto power, the increased input and throughput legitimacy could work in tandem to produce outputs (resolutions) of greater legitimacy and enforceable effect.

3.3.1 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA)

3.3.1.1 The UN General Assembly is an integral part of the global governance system as the primary forum for nation-state representation on a global level. However, its role has traditionally been limited to a forum for debate without producing concrete outcomes.

3.3.1.2 The revised UN model would bestow the UNGA with additional powers and functions to bring it into the mainstream of global political decision-making. The UNGA's role would remain to facilitate dialogue and debate between member states, but with new authority and purpose. The UNGA would take on an enhanced investigative/monitoring role through a new Executive Committee and a series of Select Committees, including an Enforcement Committee.

3.3.2 Executive Committee (UNGAEC)

The existing Secretariat has proved too weak and understaffed to adequately steer debate in the chamber. To that end, an Executive Committee would be established as a halfway point between the President and the 193 members. It would meet once a month with representatives from the UNGCC and UNSC (normally the monthly President) and consist of a small (12-15) group of members, appointed regionally. Together, the UNGAEC members would settle agenda points for the upcoming UNGA. Its wider membership would ensure debates were more relevant.

3.3.3 Select Committees (UNGASCs)

To counteract clique mentality and give the UNGA a stronger purpose, a series of elected Select Committees would replace the current committee system. Select Committees would foster more executive action outside the Security Council in non-security related matters. Unlike the current UNGA committees, the new UNGASCs would actively shape the UNGA agenda, scrutinise the work of UN agencies (to ensure work is fit for purpose and relevant in a changing context) and Member



States' actions (to ensure adherence to the UN Charter). The new UNGASCs would act as additional internal watchdogs to safeguard the integrity of the UN's Charter and Codes of Conduct. The UNGASCs would be able to summon people from across the UN spectrum to give evidence on issues in publicly accessible hearings.

3.3.4 Composition of UNGASCs

3.3.4.1 The UNGASCs would comprise:

- UNGA representatives; and
- Observers from the UNGCC and the UNGAEC (the Secretariat member being the relevant Assistant Secretary).

3.3.4.2 The UNGA committee members would be elected by the UNGA on a regional basis with full voting rights, whereas the single UNGCC member would serve as a contributor without voting rights. Including a UNGCC member would bring popular representation and global perspectives to a traditionally inter-state forum. The members of each committee as well as the Secretariat would elect the Chair of each UNGASC.

3.3.4.3 The Secretariat and UNGCC Members would be responsible for overseeing the work of each UNGASC and providing reports of the committees' work to the UNGA. The UNGA would debate and act to improve a UNGASC's work if found unsatisfactory. The inclusion of UNGCC and UNGAEC members would improve impartiality of committee oversight. Although the UNGA meets only for specified periods of the year, the UNGASCs would work through the year on issues under their remit.

3.3.5 UNGASCs by remit

- Economics
- Social and Health Issues
- Population and Migration
- UN Financing
- Trade and Development
- Global Sustainability and Environment
- Equality
- International Justice
- Enforcement
- UNGCC Elections and Management

3.3.6 Example: Enforcement Select Committee

3.3.6.1 The "Enforcement Committee" would be responsible for upholding the observation of the Charter by Member States. Its purpose would be to scrutinise behaviour by countries that might run contrary to the UN Charter. Other UNGASCs would be able to call on the Enforcement Committee when they discover recalcitrant behaviour. Likewise, the Enforcement Committee might recommend sanctions with assistance of other committees, e.g. Trade and Development. These recommendations would need to be approved by the whole UNGA.

3.3.6.2 The Enforcement Committee's sanctions would be primarily bureaucratic, e.g. removing the candidacy rights of member states for select committees, naming and shaming etc. However, the Committee would also have the power to refer cases to the UNSC, or the ICJ, where stronger punitive measures and economic sanction could be considered.



3.3.7 Legitimacy

3.3.7.1 The UNGA lacks both input and output legitimacy: popular input legitimacy as it only allows for governmental representation, which can differ from the views of the general populace; and output legitimacy, as its function in practice has been limited to debate without delivering any tangible results for people on the ground.

3.3.7.2 Outside the UNSC, the perceived input legitimacy would be greatly bolstered by the select committee proposal. For the first time states that are not on the UNSC would serve an important role in shaping the UNGA's agenda and scrutinising the work of the UN and other member states. This additional layer would improve the quality of outputs across the organisation – thus enhancing the perceived output legitimacy.

3.4 SECRETARY GENERAL (UNSG)

3.4.1 The UN Secretary-General would hold more authority and executive power than currently, to bestow greater legitimacy on the position.

3.4.2 The UNSG would be a participating but non-voting member of the UNSC, UNGCC, and the UNGA. She/he would be expected to propose matters to the UNSC proactively, attending non-public meetings of the UNSC more often to counteract the historically reactive nature of UNSC decision-making. The Secretariat has filled a similar function in the past with limited success. To give preventative security a stronger focus, this would become one of the UNSG's primary responsibilities. No UNSC member would have the power to block a matter being brought to the agenda by the UNSG under her/his preventative mandate. To give particularly controversial questions more legitimacy, such issues would be tied to global public opinion via the UNGCC under its mandate to bring matters to the UNSC through the UNSG.

3.4.3 The UNSG's term would be non-renewable on a 7-year basis. A longer term without re-election would water down larger powers' leverage over the UNSG, and remove incentives for short-term political gains in favour of longer-term thinking.

3.5 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ)

3.5.1 Problem/Mandate

3.5.1.1 The ICJ's principal problem is its inability to enforce international law and its own rulings. Sovereign inviolability and the nation state's primacy in international relations have been central tenets since the Peace of Westphalia. Only reluctantly have states signed up to elements of global governance, and rarely have the systems exercised effective jurisdiction within the physical or legislative territory of a nation state without its consent. The ICJ has struggled from its inception to get nation states to surrender sovereignty to a judicial body outside their control and/or jurisdiction. Unless states accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, and surrender a critical aspect of national sovereignty, the Court would continue to have little legitimacy/power.

3.5.1.2 The authors of this report are conscious that the prospect of bringing 193 sovereign states under the full jurisdictional umbrella of the ICJ (including the power to enforce its rulings) remains remote. China's 2016 rejection of the Philippines v. China case ruling serves as a recent illustration. For big powers, negative ICJ rulings are embarrassing and inconvenient, but have on occasion been ignored with little material consequence.



3.5.1.3 In the remodelled United Nations, the UN could help boost the ICJ's legitimacy in cases of non-compliance by enhancing the negative impact and inconvenience of a ruling. Where a state has been found guilty of breaking international law, the ICJ would monitor the guilty party's compliance with a ruling. If the state is found non-compliant and the UNSC fails to resolve the matter, it would be brought to the UNGA for debate through the Enforcement Select Committee. Having the verdict debated in a world forum such as the UNGA would bring significant embarrassment to the guilty party, and act as a soft power deterrent.

3.5.2 Legitimacy

The ICJ's lack of acceptance among nation states has greatly limited its output legitimacy. The verdicts given have been of such low legitimacy that their implementation has largely been contingent on the power relationship between the parties in the conflict. By bringing a bureaucratic sanction into the toolbox of the ICJ and UNGA combined, the new UN model would reduce the larger powers' advantages in economic or military muscle. The UNGA is set up precisely to ensure everyone is equal in front of the assembly.

3.6 WORLD EDUCATION AND TRAINING BANK (WETB)

3.6.1 Purpose, Activity, Values

3.6.1.1 The WETB would be a creative and radical development mechanism focused on education, training and governance. The expanded role proposed for it would need to be negotiated with some of existing development institutions, but gathering this agenda under one house would add power and focus to development issues. It would be guided by three aims:

1. Improving governance of systems, states and organisations;
2. Enabling these systems to absorb development assistance and multiply the benefits thereof; and
3. Enabling a state, sub-regional or regional organisation and its people to enter and benefit from global interconnectedness.

3.6.1.2 It would promote education at all levels in any country that asked for help. Better access to education would help solve problems related to poverty, gender inequality, uncontrolled population growth, global health etc.

3.6.1.3 Education would accelerate economic growth in developing countries by augmenting skills and promoting issues like human rights, gender equality and inclusion.

3.6.1.4 The WETB's education and training activities would target all strata of the global system, from the international down to the local level. Locally, the WETB would offer assistance to hard-pressed government administrations with funding and improving educational standards and practices. The WETB would also act as an aid to regional organisations, states and companies with qualitative governance deficiencies and capacity constraints who recognise a need for improvement. Skill-sharing mechanisms could identify structural deficiencies in local economies and develop paths forward to improve governance.

3.6.1.5 Access to WETB funds would be decided by the WETB, informed by the three aims outlined above. Funds would be focused where trade and development



experts on the WETB agreed was most needed. There would also be qualitative governance requirements in place: the WETB would serve as a carrot for states to actively participate in, and adhere to the rules of, the UN system by rewarding good governance. Reneging on the established ‘rules of the game’ (UN Charter, human rights etc) would restrict a state’s eligibility for WETB support.

3.6.2 Funding

3.6.2.1 The WETB would work with the core UN organs to ensure developed countries met their Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) targets of 0.7% of GNI: the function and efficiency of the WETB would rest on access to funds. Of ODA flows, a small proportion (1-5%) would be managed by the WETB and redirected to geographies and causes deemed most acute and appropriate (and limit the temptation of national allocation to deliver soft power outcomes).

3.6.2.2 Given that not only states, but also private companies and organisations would benefit from the WETB’s work, there would be an element of voluntary corporate funding. The UN’s Global Compact (GC) is a natural starting point and would be expanded and modified to fit this purpose. The GC is a UN initiative to encourage businesses to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies and report on their implementation. However, there is no certification or enforcement involved – the GC is a “guide dog, not a watchdog”. The revised GC would be a certificate and incur a ‘charge’ (or tax) on yearly revenue to be certified with a GC badge. This charge would be small enough to be acceptable to larger private corporations and large enough to make a difference in accumulation. There would be no restrictions for private or non-governmental organisations to donate to the WETB.

3.6.2.3 In trying to move away from enforcement as a purely punitive concept, the WETB would incentivise good governance or “global considerations” with compensatory funding and greater access to the resources in the WETB’s arsenal. Conversely, the WETB would be able to decide (or be ordered by the Enforcement Committee) to withdraw funding for recalcitrant states. This requires a substantial fund to generate enough power to be effective.

3.6.2.4 The benefits and opportunities provided by the system should be so appealing that no country will want to forego them. For Western, industrialised states, there would have to be an understanding of the benefits made possible by the WETB. Therefore, the WETB would help to develop a base of professional workers to meet high global standards of governance and modern commercial practice.

3.6.2.5 For developing countries, access to targeted but non-paternalistic training and development funding must be so useful that missing out on it would not be worth the short-term political benefits of e.g. repression or fiscal irresponsibility.

3.6.3 Legitimacy

3.6.3.1 The WETB would serve to enhance all three types of legitimacy.

3.6.3.2 By improving and accelerating international development through education and health efforts, the WETB could help integrate into the global economy people who have been side-lined by globalisation. One way of doing this would be retraining people whose jobs have been made obsolete by the



introduction of more advanced technologies. Governance and education could expand the economic system to include those left behind, and work to minimise the detrimental effects of globalisation and privileged trade. Hence, input legitimacy would be improved not exclusively for the UN, but for the global system.

3.6.3.3 Secondly, improving governance standards at all levels of the system would enhance its throughput legitimacy. Ineffective governance risks alienating citizens from the political and administrative process, thus eroding the throughput legitimacy of local governance. The WETB would enhance throughput legitimacy at the mid-level via improving and more consistent governance.

3.6.3.4 Finally, the WETB would significantly improve the quality of ODA outputs from the UN and its member states, thus enhancing their output legitimacy. Rapid gains in development could be made where it is most needed by targeting education and governance, rather than targets determined by national development ministries. It would allow a global institution to recast its activities as forward-looking resource development, as opposed to a post-crisis salve.

3.7 THE UN TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (UNTC)

3.7.1 Role/Mandate

3.7.1.1 The role of the UN in addressing issues emanating from technological advances has thus far been limited to the establishment in 2004 of Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications. The ephemeral nature of the GGE process and its failure to achieve consensus at the latest meeting resulted in the collapse of discussions. Though not an instant success, this UN model uses the GGE as a blueprint for deeper structural engagement with technological developments.

3.7.1.2 To expand and refine the role of the UN in better managing increasing risks associated with advancing technology (e.g cybersecurity, artificial intelligence etc), as well as bringing the organisation into the 21st century technologically, a permanent specialist UN team would be appointed by the UNSG. The UNTC would be responsible for applying new technologies to existing UN structures, as well as bringing the organisation up to date on tech matters such as those mentioned above. By bringing issues such as e.g. artificial intelligence and machine learning into the consciousness of the UN and the UNGA/UNSC where necessary, the UN would be better placed to benefit from new technology and stay more relevant.

3.7.1.3 To this end, the UNTC would be able to propose matters to the UNGCC, UNGA and the UNSG for further consideration within either UNGASCs or even the UNSC.

3.8 COUNCIL OF ELDERS FOR GOVERNANCE (CEG)

3.8.1 Role/Mandate

The reformed UN would have a team akin to the current ‘Elders’ – a specialist UN team appointed by the UNSG based on respected and experienced decision-makers taken from a global and diverse pool of candidates. The CEG would devise a standard for ‘good governance’, monitor and report to the UNSG. Based on this, the CEG would produce a governance report on national governance standards to be submitted to the UNSG and the UNGA for deliberation. States scoring low would receive oversight from a specialist governance team, and would be expected to improve their national governance. Countries would be allowed to put themselves forward for structural support. The CEG should also consider and critique new systems of governance.



3.9 HOW THE MODEL MANAGES CURRENT AND EMERGING CHALLENGES AND RISKS

3.9.1 As has been detailed above, each added or changed element of the revised UN model would improve the UN's overall legitimacy through one or more of the three categories of organisational legitimacy (input, throughput and output).

3.9.2 Better popular representation in the UN through the new UNGCC would increase input legitimacy, as would expanding the UNSC and reactivating the UNGA's role in international politics. Second, the WETB would help to integrate troubled states into the world economy and global system. Third, the UNGCC's pivotal role in UNSC proceedings and the new UNGA Select Committees would enhance transparency, efficiency and accountability, as would a successful WETB global training programme, thus increasing the UN's throughput legitimacy. Finally, all amendments and additions, particularly the WETB, the UNSG's extended mandate and the UNSC veto reform would improve the UN's output legitimacy.

3.9.3 Together, the changes and accompanying improved legitimacy would address the three problems outlined at the beginning of the report (see 2.1).

3.9.4 Governance standards world-wide would be improved by greater scrutiny and support from the newly instituted UNGASCs, CEG and WETB – all of which have specific mandates to monitor, assess and improve states' and organisations' governance performance. They would also be able to focus on macro-level issues such as climate change, sustainability and migration.

3.9.5 The fading commitment to multilateralism is partly due to the current system's inability to deliver tangible results. The failure to distribute the benefits of globalisation evenly leaves many with no stake in a growing world economy. Only when the system delivers more egalitarian outcomes will it be trusted by a critical mass. By improving outputs from the system (according to the suggested model), perceived legitimacy and faith in the multilateral system would rebound.

3.9.6 By mending inequalities between individuals, peoples and nations, the model would help to promote sustainable (and fairer) economic growth at the global level.

4. Motivation

4.1 CORE VALUES

4.1.1 The proposed model takes effective multilateralism and the “greatest happiness of the greatest number” as keystones on which everything else rests. By enhancing the United Nations' ability to follow and deliver on the Charter, the suggested model expresses and implements the values enshrined in the UN Charter. What is more, changes and additions to the UN as described would have direct and specific consequences for the UN's adherence to equality and sustainable global progress.

4.1.2 The UNGCC would be constructed and designed on a platform of equality and global citizenship. The UNGCC would give equal representation to all people through a gender-balanced Senatorship, which is voted for by the people of each state, rather than appointed by governments. Senators would better represent



the interests of the people, and would be able to help shape international policy accordingly.

4.1.3 Expanding the UN Security Council and reforming the veto process allows for stronger representation of states and regions and greater appeal to global opinion. With constraints on veto power, the UNSC would be better able to conduct international security policy and protect vulnerable people across the world.

4.1.4 The UNGA Select Committees are specifically set up to enhance UN efficiency and consolidate adherence to the Charter. A main feature of the Equality Select Committee is to shape the agenda in the UNGA and improve the work done on equality throughout the UN and within member states. By dedicating an UNGASC to Equality, the new UN model demonstrates that it takes equality seriously – whether in gender, ethnicity or nationality.

4.1.5 The WETB is dedicated to promoting and emphasising the power of education, and incorporating the importance of global equality. Its philanthropic mission is grounded in a conviction of all human beings' equal value. Further, its modus operandi is informed by widespread research demonstrating that equality, aside from its inherent ethical value, is a principal driver of economic growth in all societies (Source2). By promoting equality, countries could activate a larger proportion of their available workforce and propel themselves to greater prosperity.

4.1.6 Finally, the CEG's mandate to monitor and report on governance standards plays an important role in promoting governmental adherence to good governance standards and the UN Charter. As equality remains a cornerstone of the UN Charter, this additional layer of promotion, whilst less intrusive than the UNGASC, for example, helps keep issues like equality on the agenda.

4.2 DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY

4.2.1 The reforms proposed above to the UN Security Council would have radical effects on its decision-making capacity. The new regime blunts the veto, to let through resolutions that are in the interests of the majority of states, yet keeps the essence of P5 privilege intact. In cases where the threat to international peace and security is manifest but complex, the additional incentive to win the objective argument and adopt a resolution would strengthen the decision-making capacity of the UNSC – arguably the part of the UN where it is most needed. It is important to emphasise that the authors do not expect the expansion of non-permanent seats in the UNSC to hamper its decision-making capacity. Rather, the increased membership, without promoting new permanent members, increases the relative leverage of the non-Permanent members as a bloc and, coupled with the veto restraint and the link with regional organisations, enables the Council to fulfil its global remit more effectively in the interests of all UN member states.

4.2.2 The UNGASCs are introduced as a mechanism to enhance accountability in the UN system and to give the UNGA executive bite. By maintaining pressure on individuals and bodies to adhere to satisfactory governance and performance standards, the UNGASCs work as internal UN watchdogs. The UNGASCs push UN servants, decision-makers, and even member states to make stronger and more transparent decisions.



4.2.3 Throughout the model, attention and care has been given to issues of decision-making capacity and expediency. The authors are acutely aware of the sometimes crippling bureaucracy of the UN and the reputational damage this has done. Expanding the working machinery of the UN by more than we have proposed would exacerbate the problem. Hence, all additions to the UN outlined above have been streamlined to minimise the procedural and bureaucratic hurdles.

4.3 EFFECTIVENESS

4.3.1 The proposed UN reforms aim to improve and enhance the effectiveness of a body plagued by bureaucratic inertia, organisational overstretch and fading legitimacy.

4.3.2 First, the revised veto process would greatly decrease any one power's capacity to hold up international action on security issues where the majority's interests dictate otherwise. The Middle East in particular is a region whose current condition threatens global peace and where much earlier action might have been possible in the absence of a P5 Veto.

4.3.3 Second, as the principal decision-making forum on international peace and security, the UNSC must debate the right topics at the relevant time. By giving the UNSG greater authority and opportunity to shape debate in the UNSC, the proposed model would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the UN to identify and manage security issues.

4.3.4 Third, the UNGA Executive Committee would shape and steer debate in the UNGA to enhance the Chamber's effectiveness and ensure that the right questions receive timely attention.

4.3.5 Finally, the UNGASCs, under their monitoring and reviewing mandate, would keep pressure on institutions and on member states to carry out their work and delegated tasks to the highest possible standards (and timeliness).

4.4 RESOURCES AND FINANCING

4.4.1 UN financing has been a stumbling block for much of its existence, as member states have increasingly failed to see concrete returns for their financial contributions. Whilst the United States, Japan and the Europeans have traditionally provided the largest financial contributions, some states have found opportunities to free-ride or have simply not had the financial capability to contribute appropriately.

4.4.2 The revised UN system must provide evidence that the global institutions must deliver outcomes that are positive and tangible enough to demonstrate that the benefits of participating far outweigh the costs. Thus, by raising the visibility and quality of the system's outputs, this model should promote a greater willingness of member states to contribute fairly to the system. However, certain tangible mechanisms would need to be in place to guarantee initial funding.

4.4.3 The UNGCC would require financial support for elections and its general working. To that end, the UNGCC-UNGA Select Committee will devise a sliding scale, with richer states contributing more (and poorer states less) to a central UNGCC fund, managed by the Committee.



4.4.4 Finally, under the new regime, the WETB would be endowed with significant funds, closely aligned with ODA commitments, as explained in 1.8 above.

4.5 TRUST AND INSIGHT

4.5.1 The UNGCC would add a crucial element of transparency and insight into the workings of the UN. The UNGCC Senators are elected from the people, by the people. Letting these representatives review UNSC and UNGA performance and sit in the UN family would not only address the democratic deficit in the current institutional machinery, but also demonstrate that the UN takes seriously the views and input of the people.

4.5.2 Expanding UNSC membership, though by a limited degree to maintain efficiency, would increase member states' alignment to its decisions. A larger number of states would gain insight into its workings and deliberations. The added UNGCC member representing the 25% lowest earning countries – a group that would rarely win representation on the Council – would serve to balance the image of privilege for larger, richer countries.

4.5.3 The veto reform would send a powerful signal to the rest of the UN membership that multilateralism remains a cardinal principle, while preserving confidence that priority remains for national sovereignty imperatives.

4.5.4 The UNGASCs would in themselves represent an important enhancement of trust and oversight of the UN system. The member states would have significant stakeholder and agency responsibilities, thus increasing their interest in the health of the system overall. As all hearings and reports by the UNGASCs would be publicly available, this would provide improved transparency and insight into the workings and performance of the UN.

4.5.5 The ICJ is not a transparent organisation, nor is the subject matter it deals with – international law is by its complexity accessible to only a limited audience. However, by subjecting recalcitrant and non-compliant states to greater visibility and censure, the verdicts will be given greater political import. The more (and longer) a verdict is debated, the greater the pressure to comply.

4.6 FLEXIBILITY

Under its new and extended mandate, the UNGA would play a crucial role in adapting the UN structure to shifting external and internal realities. Having nine (or more) Select Committees, dedicated to monitoring and reporting on the work of various UN bodies (and member states), would provide a safeguard against institutional complacency and/or inertia. Poor performance by institutions or states, or the failure to respond to new developments for example in political or technological contexts, would be detected by the UNGASCs and spark a political and institutional response to ensure improvement.

4.7 PROTECTION AGAINST THE ABUSE OF POWER

4.7.1 This revised UN model would enhance the organisation's institutional resistance to the abuse of power, and improper interference in the affairs of nation-states (by letting the UNGCC operate its monitoring mandate). By monitoring and reviewing UNSC resolutions, the UNGCC would provide a useful check/balance to any UNSC overreach.



4.7.2 Next, an expanded UNSC would allow more voices into the decision-making process and broaden political perspectives. States like France and the United Kingdom have previously channelled collective concerns of EU members into UN debate, bringing a wider European perspective into the room. With new members from South America and Asia, as well as other developing countries, and with stronger links to the regional organisations, this effect would be enlarged.

4.7.3 The reformed veto process would limit the abuse of national preference by the big powers. Moreover, the veto has often been used by the permanent members to shield and protect allies in the name of national interest. In blatant cases of e.g. human rights violations, the constraint on the veto would bring a more collective judgment to bear.

4.7.4 Finally, the UNGA Select Committees would provide the strongest check against any abuse of power, through their monitoring and reviewing mandate. The UNGASCs would be set up precisely to safeguard UN bodies' and member states' good practice and control the quality of their outputs. The Enforcement Committee's ability to impose bureaucratic sanctions on bodies/states/persons judged to violate Codes of Conduct, as well as to refer them to the UNSC or the ICJ, would add ammunition to the UN arsenal.

4.8 ACCOUNTABILITY

4.8.1 The revised UN model would have two primary mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of the organisation: the UNGASCs and the CEG.

4.8.2 As will have become clear from the sections above, the UNGASCs – if well chaired and managed – would enlarge the UNGA's opportunity for executive action. Not only would they protect against the abuse of power, guarantee effectiveness and enhance decision-making capacity, they would add a layer of accountability. It would no longer be feasible for leaders inside or outside the organisation to fail in their duties without expecting scrutiny.

4.8.3 Similarly, the CEG's role would be to monitor the quality of governance at an international level, strengthening the UNSG's capacity to call poor performance to account.

4.8.4 These added layers of oversight, structural support and practical instruments would amount to a wholly new capacity in the international community to entrench the value of good governance and sanction those who ignore it.

References

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